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Abstract
In this paper a notion of privacy-anomaly detection is presented where normative privacy is modelled using k-anonymity.
Based on the model, normative privacy-profiles are constructed, and deviation from normative privacy-profile at run-
time is labelled as a privacy-anomaly. Furthermore, the paper investigates whether there is a correlation between
security-anomalies and privacy-anomalies, that is, whether the privacy-anomalies labelled by privacy-anomaly detec-
tion system are detected by conventional security-anomaly detection system used for detecting malicious accesses to
databases by insiders.
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1. Introduction
One of the challenges in releasing data for analytic is of safeguarding the privacy of individuals whose
data is being released. Privacy preservation is achieved using data anonymization. However, we have seen
numerous incidents where the privacy was compromised due to poor anonymization of released data, for
example, the popular case of Netflix [19], AOL [2] and de-anonymization of NYC taxi data [8]. For this rea-
son researchers have devised privacy definitions, such as k-anonymity [23], l-diversity [17], t-closeness [16],
and differential privacy [7], to provide formal guarantees.
We are interested in an anomaly-detection based approach to privacy. Anomaly detection techniques have
been widely used in many domains, such as networks and Database Management Systems (DBMS) security
to detect attacks [21, 9, 10, 13]. In principle, anomaly detection techniques have the potential to detect
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zero-day or unknown attacks [20]. Anomaly detection techniques work by looking for a deviation from
normative behaviour. Thus, at the heart of an anomaly detection system is a model of normative behaviour.
In literature, attempts have been made to capture different aspects of normative behaviours to have an
accurate model. We put forward a unique perspective where we model normative from privacy perspective.
In this paper, we propose the notion of privacy-anomaly detection that is based on extracting parameters
of privacy definitions from logs of past behaviour and building privacy-profiles. Additionally, in this paper,
we introduce the notion of privacy-anomaly that is a deviation from the profile constructed by extracting
parameters of privacy definitions. The main idea is that we analyze past behaviour, which gives us a model
that can be used to check subsequent behaviours, where past behaviour is the interaction between the
database and the users querying that database. The paper also considers the question of whether there is
a correlation between security-anomalies and privacy-anomalies. For ease of exposition, this paper uses k-
anonymity to formulate a definition of normative privacy. The scenario that we present in this paper is to
model the value for k, in particular, we look at the output of past queries and based on those output tables,
we infer the value of k.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background on anomaly detection and
privacy models. Section 3 defines the notion of a privacy-anomaly detection along with its näıve instantiation
based on k-anonymity. Section 4 explores whether there is a correlation between security-anomalies and
privacy-anomalies. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Background
This section covers the background required for the proposed privacy-anomaly detection model by de-
scribing an abstract design of anomaly detection techniques and discusses the adopted privacy model for
this work.
2.1. Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection techniques have been widely used in saveral domains; for example, the popular appli-
cation domains include intrusion detection, image processing, sensor networks, medical anomaly detection
and fault detection [4]. Intrusion detection can be further divided into sub-domains depending on the con-
text in which the intrusion detection systems is deployed for instance database intrusion detection systems
where anomaly detection techniques are used to detect malicious accesses to Database Management Sys-
tems (DBMS) [10, 21]. Another example is of network intrusion detection systems where anomaly detection
techniques monitor network traffic to detect attacks [3, 29]. Typically anomaly detection technique has two
phases, that is a training phase (learning phase) and a detection phase. In training (learning phase), a
normative profile of normative behaviour is built. In the detection phase, ‘activities’ are checked if they be-
long to the normative profile if they deviate then this deviation is labelled as an anomaly. The challenge in
anomaly detection is of accurately modelling behaviour as it is possible that one can capture some aspects
of normative behaviour and misses some aspects of it.
Anomaly-based database intrusion detection systems are typically deployed to detect malicious accesses
to the database by insiders where an insider is a person that belongs to an organization and is authorized
to access a range of data and services. In literature, there are several anomaly-based database intrusion
detection systems (for ease of exposition we refer to them as security-anomaly detection systems) that
model normative behaviour of a user/role by considering queries made by that user/role to the database
and subsequently normative profile is constructed using these model [21, 10, 9, 18, 5, 11, 14].
2.2. Adopted Privacy Model
Several forms of privacy have been formalized in the literature. The two mainstream definitions of privacy
are k-anonymity [23] and differential privacy [7]. k-anonymity can be considered among the first formal def-
initions of privacy and serves as the foundation for several privacy definitions that includes l-diversity [17],
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t-closeness [16], (α, k)-anonymity [25]. These privacy models are described within the framework of re-
lational databases. We adopted k-anonymity firstly because this is an exploratory study, therefore, using a
well-understood privacy model like k-anonymity enables a better understanding of the subject being ex-
plored and helps to avoid underlying complexities associated with other more complex privacy definitions.
Secondly, k-anonymity served as a foundation of many subsequent formal privacy definitions, which is a
good indicator of the applicability of this study onto other privacy definitions.
In the context of k-anonymity, attributes are classified in the following non-exclusive categories, Identi-
fiers, Quasi-Identifiers, and Sensitive attributes. The classification is typically performed based on the risk of
record re-identification using these attributes and the sensitivity of the information these attributes convey.
An identifier is defined as “an attribute that refers to only a particular individual in the given population U”. An
example of an identifier is the Personal Public Service Number (PPS Number) which can uniquely identify
individuals in Ireland. Other examples include an individual’s passport number, driving license number, and
e-mail address. Quasi-identifiers by themselves do not uniquely identify individuals; however, when corre-
lated with other available external data, an individual (or individuals) can be identified. A quasi-identifier is
defined in [23, 22] as a “set of non-sensitive attributes of a relation if linked with external data to then uniquely
identify at least one individual in the population U”. Let the set of quasi-identifiers be denoted as QI where
each quasi-identifier is denoted as qi. An example of quasi-identifier is the set of attributes Zipcode, Date
of Birth, and Gender. For instance, the set of attributes Zipcode, Date of Birth, and Gender was used
to re-identify governor of Massachusetts in [23, 22]. The re-identification was performed by directly linking
shared attributes in two datasets, i.e. voter rolls and insurance company datasets. It was reported that 87%
of the US population could be identified by these three attributes [23, 22]. Sensitive attributes consist of
sensitive person-specific information. This information includes salary, disability status, or disease.
k-anonymity is defined in [23] as follows, “a relation T satisfies k-anonymity if and only if each tuple
ri[QI] ∈ T appears with at least k occurrence in T”. k-anonymity provides a degree of anonymity if the data
for each person cannot be distinguished from k-1 individuals in a released dataset with respect to a set of
quasi-identifiers. Given QI then two tuples ri and r j are quasi-identifier equivalent if ri[QI] = r j[QI]. The
relation T can be divided into quasi-identifier equivalence classes. Let the set of all the equivalence classes
in T be E where each equivalence class e ∈ E consists of all the rows that have the same values for each
quasi-identifier. Another way to define k-anonymity is that a relation T satisfies k-anonymity if the minimum
equivalence class size is at least k in T. Originally, k-anonymity was proposed for a one-time release of data,
meaning that the user is not enabled to query the DBMS interactively. Though considered to be among
the first privacy definitions, k-anonymity, has been widely applied in many domains to preserve privacy for
examples Location-based services [28, 26, 27, 24, 30], ride-hailing services [15], and webmail auditing [6].
k-anonymity has been used along with cryptographic hashing to develop a protocol that provides a degree
of anonymity while checking for passwords in a compromised databases [1].
3. Privacy-anomaly Detection System
This section described the notion of privacy-anomaly detection system. At design-level, the privacy-
anomaly detection system has two phases, similar to conventional anomaly detection systems, that are a
training (learning) phase and a detection phase. The normative k-anonymity based privacy-profile is mined
in the training phase while in the detection phase a run-time privacy-profile is constructed and compared
against the normative privacy-profile. In the next section, we also describe the structure of k-Anonymity
based privacy-profile.
3.1. A k-Anonymity based Privacy-profile
In the proposed model k-anonymity is used to specify a privacy limit [[k , q]], whereby k individual must
share the same quasi identifier q values in the result of a query. Intuitively, this means for that particular
response, for a sufficient value of k, an adversary can only narrow down to k individuals. In the case where an
adversary has a secondary dataset with overlapping quasi-identifier values, then the query response can be
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Table 1: A fragment of relation temp table.
age zipcode city gender salary
>55 989234 Paris Male 60K
>55 989234 Paris Male 92K
>55 989234 Paris Male 77K
>45 839523 Paris Male 50K
>35 839777 London Male 60K
>35 839777 London Male 63K
>35 839777 London Male 85K
>35 839777 London Male 70K
>35 839777 London Male 60K
>50 839567 Paris Female 72K
>50 839567 London Female 62K
>50 839567 Paris Female 92K
>50 839567 London Female 77K
>50 839567 Paris Female 68K
linked to k different individuals, therefore minimizing the risk of re-identification. In the model the privacy-
profile is defined as a set of privacy limits. In terms of privacy, each privacy limit means that in a particular
instance of a query response an adversary won’t be able to distinguish an individual’s quasi-identifier values
from k individuals for the set of quasi-identifiers that appeared in the query response. Consider a relation
temp table, as shown in Table 1, having several attributes including a sensitive attribute salary, and quasi-
identifiers age, gender, zipcode, and city. For ease of exposition we assume the values for attribute age
are aggregated into age ranges, for instance, all the values for attribute age above 55 are represented as
>55. Given a mined privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]], in privacy-profile, then the response to the analyst
query SELECT age, zipcode FROM temp table WHERE gender = ‘Male’ AND city = ‘Paris’ AND age
> 55; as shown in Table 2 is not anomalous since the value of k for the the quasi-identifiers {age, zipcode}
in the response is greater than 3.
Table 2: A relation TR1 resulting from
the query SELECT age, zipcode






Table 3: A relation TR2 resulting from
the query SELECT age, zipcode,
city FROM temp table WHERE gender
= ‘male’;.
age zipcode county salary
>55 839523 Paris 60K
>55 839523 Paris 92K
>55 839523 Paris 77K
>45 839523 Paris 50K
>35 839777 London 60K
>35 839777 London 63K
>35 839777 London 85K
>35 839777 London 70K
>35 839777 London 60K
Table 4: A relation TR3 resulting from
the query SELECT age, zipcode








3.2. Mining k-anonymity based Profiles for PAD
The instances of the privacy model are mined from audit logs in order to generate privacy-profiles. We
refer to a privacy-profile that is mined from past logs in the learning phase as a normative privacy-profile.
The idea is to learn the k values for sets of quasi-identifier(s) by mining past audit logs and interpret those
mined ‘privacy limits’ as ‘normal’.
Given an audit log L∗, consisting of query responses, Pri(L∗) gives a privacy-profile consisting of privacy
limits mined from log L∗, where q ∈ QI represent a set of quasi-identifier. A normative privacy-profile is
generated from an anomaly-free past log L∗norm and is denoted by Pri(L
∗
norm) = { [[k1, q1]], [[k2, q2]], . . . , [[km, qm]]
}. For example, consider the relation TR2 shown in Table 3, the mined value of k for the set of quasi-identifiers
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{age, zipcode, city} is 4, that is, [[4, {age, zipcode, city}]] ∈ Pri(L∗norm). In essence, we are constructing
privacy limit (L∗, q) which returns k as a limit to the privacy in the table for a given q. The normative
privacy-profile is effectively a set of these privacy limits mined against the logs for a given set of quasi-
identifiers. Intuitively, the tuples in the normative privacy-profile shows to what extent one narrows down
to individuals records in normative settings.
3.3. Detecting Privacy-anomalies
The detection phase, in terms of privacy, checks if an adversary is able to narrow down to fewer than k
individuals for a given set of quasi-identifiers in the normative profile. In the instance, where the adversary
is able to narrow down to fewer than specified k individuals for a given set of quasi-identifier then this
instance is labelled as a privacy-anomaly and poses higher risk of re-identification relative to normal. During





constructed run-time profile. Given privacy limits [[ki, qi]] and [[k j, q j]] then [[ki, qi]] subsumes [[k j, q j]] (denoted
[[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]]) if imposing privacy limit [[k j, q j]] instead of [[ki, qi]] leads to no additional loss of privacy.
Formally,
[[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]] ≡ qi ⊆ q j ∧ k j ≥ ki
In the case where [[ki, qi]] ∈ Pri(L∗norm) and [[k j, q j]] ∈ Pri(L∗run) then [[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]] means that [[k j, q j]] can
be safely replaced by [[ki, qi]] without any loss of privacy. If a privacy limit subsumes another intuitively it
means if the subsumed privacy limit is replaced by the one that subsumes it then there is no loss of privacy.
Consider the response of a query at run-time shown in Table 4, and that there exists a privacy limit
[[3, {age, zipcode}]] in Pri(L∗norm). The mined value k of the set of quasi-identifier {age, zipcode} is greater than
3 therefore this privacy limit [[5, {age, zipcode}]] in Pri(L∗run) is considered to be subsumed by the privacy limit
[[3, {age, zipcode}]] in Pri(L∗norm). In terms of privacy, it means given that this instance of query response an
adversary can narrow down so many individuals as one normally is able to for a given set of quasi-identifiers.
4. Correlation between Security and Privacy-anomalies
This section aims to discover whether anomalies labelled by a privacy-anomaly detection system pre-
sented in Section 3.2 are labelled as anomalies by the conventional anomaly detection systems. For the sake
of clarity, we call the conventional anomaly detection systems as a security-anomaly detection system. One
such security-anomaly detection system is proposed in [10].
4.1. Security-anomaly Detection System based on n-gram
The security-anomaly detection system in [10], models normative behaviours using n-grams of normal
query patterns extracted from the audit log of SQL queries of an application system. SQL queries were trans-
formed into an abstract representation. Subsequently, a normative profile was constructed that consisted
of sets of n-grams of SQL query abstractions. For a given sequence L of SQL queries, abs(L) represents the
abstraction of SQL queries in L and ngram(abs(L),n) is the set of all sub-sequences of size n that appear in
abs(L). Lets say abs(L) = abs(Q1), abs(Q2), abs(Q3), abs(Q4) then a 2-gram model for abs(L) will be {〈abs(Q1),
abs(Q2)〉, 〈abs(Q2), abs(Q3)〉, 〈abs(Q3), abs(Q4)〉}.
4.2. Discovering Correlations
This section explores whether privacy-anomalies (as identified by the model in Section 3.2) are also iden-
tified as security-anomalies by a security-anomaly detection system in [10]). The security-anomaly detection
system in [10] relies on n-grams to construct profiles of querying behaviours using audit logs of SQL queries.
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The system in [10] effectively detects malicious accesses by insider to a database management system. A
query generator was designed that had defined a set of SQL query templates and the underlying database
was populated with a synthetic (hospital) dataset. Query templates were designed to be executed on the
hospital dataset and mimicked the health-care analytics scenario. A fragment of the dataset is shown in
Table 5.
Logs were generated for construction of a normative profile and another for the construction of a run-
time profile. The training logs (anomaly-free) for the n-gram based approach are denoted by Lhospnorm, while
the anomalous run-time logs for the hospital datasets are denoted by Lhosprun .
To construct normative and run-time profiles using the n-gram model, selection of an appropriate value
of the size of n-gram was desirable for the hospital dataset. To select an appropriate size of an n-gram in this
scenario, test logs Lhosptest1 and L
hosp
test2 were generated in a safe environment (anomaly-free). N-gram profiles were
constructed with varying n-gram size, that are, ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and ngram(L
hosp
test2 , n), and generated profiles
were compared. Figure 1 depicts the number of n-gram mismatches arising when comparing the normal test
ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and ngram(L
hosp
test2 , n), for different values of n. From the experiments, the n-gram of the size of
4 (n = 4) was considered optimal as it resulted in an acceptable number of mismatches.
Figure 1: The figure shows the number of mismatches between ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and ngram(L
hosp
test2 , n) for different values of n.
Once the value of n was decided upon, the normative and run-time profiles were constructed for the ex-
periments. Given the training logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run n-gram profiles were constructed such that ngram(L
hosp
norm, 4)
and ngram(Lhosprun , 4), and subsequently the normative and runtime profiles were compared.
The same queries in logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run were executed in the presence of the privacy-anomaly detec-
tion system (described in Section 3) resulting in logs of query responses Lhosp∗norm and L
hosp∗
run . Subsequently, a
normative privacy-profile Pri(Lhosp∗norm ) and a run-time Pri(L
hosp∗
run ) profiles were constructed and compared.
The attribute patient ID and e-mail ID were considered as a unique identifier, the attribute diagnosis
was considered as a sensitive attribute while the rest of the attributes including first name, last name,
status, dob, gender, city, and marital status were considered as quasi-identifiers. For the experimen-
tation, two categories of privacy-anomalies were injected as described in Table 6. Using this anomaly-
containing run-time log, from 15 privacy-anomalies 13 were detected by the n-gram based security-anomaly
detection system proposed in [10] and the privacy-anomaly detection system proposed in this paper.
4.3. Detected Privacy-anomalies
The n-gram based security-anomaly detection system detected all those privacy-anomalies that were gen-
erated by injecting one more attribute into the relation. The privacy-anomalies injected by adding one more
attribute were identified as privacy-anomalies by both systems. The reason that they were identified was
because there were no n-gram that contained a reference to new attribute in its query abstraction.
One of the detected privacy-anomalies corresponds to the query: SELECT diagnoses, dob, city,
country FROM hospitalDB WHERE dob = ‘1981’ AND city = ‘London’;
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Table 5: A fragment of hospital dataset. The strike-through attribute values represents a deleted row.
dob city gender diagnoses country ...
1981 London Male Flu UK ...
1981 London Male Flu UK ...
1981 London Male Diarrhoea US ...
1920 Paris Male Heart Disease UK ...
1981 Berlin Female Acne UK ...
1984 Berlin Male Flu Australia ...
1984 Berlin Male Diabetes UK ...
1984 Berlin Male Hypertension UK ...
1984 Berlin Male Leg Fracture Portugal ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
1981 London Male Flu US ...





Addition of one or more attributes to the base relation
shown in Table 5. For instance, a new attribute,
like country, was inserted in the relation and queries
were made to retrieve this attribute values.
5
Update or Deletion of records from relation
shown in Table 5 10
Table 7: Response to a undetected privacy-anomalous query.
dob city diagnoses
1920 Paris Heart Disease
The normative privacy-profile contains no privacy limit reference to the new (or combination of new)
attribute.
4.4. Undetected Privacy-anomalies
A privacy-anomaly undetected by the n-gram based approach but detected by the privacy model is: SELECT
dob, city, diagnoses FROM hospitalDB WHERE dob = ‘1920’ AND city = ‘Paris’ ;
The query returns a relation with one record as shown in Table 7. It is identified as a privacy-anomaly by
the privacy model for the reason being that the specified value of k for the specified set of quasi-identifier
meant that an adversary was able to single out an individual. This anomaly is undetected by n-gram based
security-anomaly detection approach because there was an n-gram in normative profile contained a refer-
ence to this query abstraction.
In the examples above, the privacy-anomalies illustrated are based on a single query rather than a query
sequence.
4.5. Identifying Appropriate Privacy Limits
In order to find the optimal values of k, in the mining process, in theory, all the combinations of quasi-
identifiers need to be considered. This, in essence, is a combinatorial explosion, especially in the case of a
large number of quasi-identifiers. Additionally, one may discover either very large or very small values of k
in practice for certain combinations of quasi-identifiers. Therefore, in order to discover reasonable values of
k, one may define a range while mining the values of k such that the values falling within the range and
their corresponding combinations of quasi-identifiers are considered for privacy-profiles.
5. Conclusions
The paper proposed the notion of privacy-anomaly detection and described a näıve instantiation based on
well-known privacy model, that is, k-anonymity. The idea is to model normative privacy by mining privacy
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limits from logs for past interaction and construct normative privacy-profiles in the training phase. While in
the detection phase, a run-time privacy-profile is constructed and checked against normative privacy limits
in normative privacy-profile. The deviations between the normative privacy profile and run-time privacy
profile are labelled as privacy-anomalies. As this is an exploratory study, therefore, k-anonymity is used as it
served as a foundation of many subsequent formal privacy definitions, which is a good indicator of the appli-
cability of this study onto other privacy definitions. Furthermore, the näıve instantiation of privacy-anomaly
detection system was demonstrated in this paper over a synthetic dataset. The paper also considered the
question of whether there is a correlation between security-anomalies (access control anomalies) and the
privacy-anomalies. For this study, a conventional security-anomaly that detects database access by malicious
insiders (employees of an organisation) was adopted. The security-anomaly detection system used n-grams
to model query behaviours. It was discovered that conventional security-anomaly detection system labelled
some of the privacy-anomalies while some of the privacy-anomalies went undetected.
In future, we plan to further the work by investigating advanced instantiation of a privacy-anomaly de-
tection system based on the composition of several privacy models. A potential instantiation of privacy-
anomaly detection system is to mine normative privacy-profiles in-terms of identification capabilities of SQL
queries [12] made to DBMS.
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